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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J.DrF;S S. S'l'ANK and 
PRISCILLA 1\L 8TANK 
dba ACl\IE AUDIT ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiffs-Respond en ts, 
-VS.-
JOHN ROBERT JONES, 
Def end ant-Appellant. 
Case 
No. 10276 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
The question is whether Plaintiffs-Respondents, as 
assignees of several claims for collection, are entitled to 
prosecute suit on the claims in their own name, or if the 
assignors are indispensable parties. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The 'rrial Court denied defendant-appellant's mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
,., 
I 
Respondents seek confirmation of the judgment of , 
the Lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant's Statement of l<~acts includes M· 
eral conjectural matters. 'l'he facts, as indicated lir 
the present state of the record, are as followi,;: 
Plaintiffs-Respondents filed thii,; action in the Third 
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah, as the 
assignees of several claims against the Defemla11t-.\r-
pellant. A written assignment of each claim was cw-
cuted by the assignor and delivered to plaintiff assignee. 
Pursuant to the demaud of Defendant-Appl'llant 
the Plaintiff-Respondents, who are reside11ts of Dl'11nr, 
Colorado, executed and filed with the Trial Comt a noli-
resident cost bond in or about Fehruary, lf)(i4, wliid1 ;, 
now current and effective. 
On or about the 19th day of Nonmher l~J(i4, senr:tl 
motions having been theretofore heard and determinr·cl 
by the Trial Court, a further hearing wai,; hall on .\p 
pellant 's motion to dismiss or for judgnwnt on the plrad 
ings. This motion was made upon the sole, stated gronwl 
that Plaintiff's assignors were indispensable parti<';; 111 
the action ( R-45). 
2 
ARGU:\IENT 
POINT I 
'11 HI<: ASSIGNJ'vIENTS WITH WHICH THIS 
('ON'l'ROVERSY IS CONCERNED WERE 
Ft:LL AND COMPLETE AND THE ASSIGN-
~~ES AR~~ THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
1:; THIS SUIT. 
A 110tarizecl written assignment ·was executed and de-
!i1rred t.o Plaintiffs-Respondents by each of the assign-
ors ol' the claims here in controversy. In each instance 
the ast>ig11or assig11ecl to Plaintiffs, "their heirs, execu-
t111,-, administrators and assigns, all my right, title and 
i11tr·rest in and to a certain account current and stat-
r•tl. ... '' Further, each assit,,rnment states, "Hereby au-
thorizing· tl10 said assignees, their agents, attorneys, 
heirs allll nssig11s, to receive, sue for, collect and re-
r·c·ipt for ~urh account in their name or otherwise and to 
rlrr aml iwrform every act and thing necessary and prop-
er to be clonr in the premises, irrevocably, as fully as I 
might or could do if personally present at the doing 
thereof.'' 
B~- the express language of these written ass1gn-
IOl'nls tlw assignors have assigned ALL of their "right, 
title and interPst'' in the claims in controversy. It is, 
therefore, a complete contradiction of the facts to state 
that the assignors ''retained an intereest in the action.'' 
l1nless arnl until these actions are reassigned to the 
original assignors, the latter have no legal interest in the 
action a]](l cannot legally maintain any separate action 
against Appellant on an individual claim heretofore 
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assigned to Plaintiffs-Respondents. It may be thai 
assignors have acquired a new beneficial interest in the 
net proceeds of the claim assigned, but this creates a re. 
lationship between the assignors and assignees with 
which the debtor defendant cannot properly be ron-
cerned. In fact, the assignor in each of these claims 
has bargained and sold his legal title and interest thercill 
to the assignees-plaintiffs, and has receind in part, 
therefor, a contingent beneficial interest. But the only 
concern of the debtor defendant here is whether or not 
plaintiffs acquired the full and complete legal title. To 
hold that plaintiffs have not acquired the full legal tit!P 
is to do violence to the language of the contractural 
agreement between the assignors and the assignees. 
The McAulay Case cited by Appellant as authority 
for the proposition that the plaintiffs' assignors an' 
indispensable parties has a clearly distinguishable fac-
tual background. It should be noted immediately that 
the facts do not involve an assignment. Therefore, any 
argument, whatever its force or lack of force, must be 
made by analogy. Respondents submit that there is no 
force whatsoever in the cited case which can aid Apprl-
lant 's cause. Clearly an undisputed 43 1/3 per rent in-
terest in a claim would render the owner thereof an 
indispensable party in an action brought to enforce the 
claim. But, in citing this case, Appellant has erred in 
that he has assumed the very question which he seeks 
to raise and to have determined favorably to himself, 
i. e.; whether Respondents' assignors have made a full 
and complete assignment of their claims. 
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This Court has met the objection raised in this 
appeal on several occasions and has consistently held 
that the assignee is the real party in interest and that as 
such, the assignors were not and could not he indispen-
iable parties. The precise question was raised in the 
rase of Chesney v. District Co11rt of Salt Lake County, 
9Y Utah 513, wherein the Court stated: 
''Plaintiffs argue, in support of their position, 
that Brown is not the real party in interest for 
the reason that he is neither actually nor substan-
tially interested in the subject matter of the suit, 
and that his only interest, if such it can be called, 
is that of collector. This court, in conformity with 
the weight of judicial authority, is committed to 
the doctrine that the assignee of a chose in action 
or promissory note after maturity and for the 
purpose of collection alone may sue in his own 
name and as such is the real party in interest.'' 
Tl1e court cites considerable authority for the 
holding. 
In the case of Campbell v. Peter, 108 Utah 565, a case 
decided some four years after the Chesney case, the Court 
firmly restated the holding of the latter case when it 
,,aid: 
''We will not again go into the question of 
whether an assignee of a chose in action who holds 
merely for the purpose of collection is 'the real 
party in interest.' We have repeatedly held that 
he is." (Citing Chesney and other cases) 
As recently as 1962 this Court has reaffirmed that 
holding when, in Lynch v. McDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, ref-
erence is once again made with approval to the Chesney 
and Campbell cases and others. 
That this Court is on solid ground in this mat!r:r 1, 
attested by our Sister Courts, wherein the Yast major-
ity support the proposition that an assig11ee, €\'en 
though his assignment be exclusively for collection aud 
the whole beneficial interest be in the assignor, is the real 
party in interest, and consequently, the assignor is not 
and cannot be an indispensable party. Aside from the 
Ohio Court cited by Appellant in his brief, the ease la\\' 
indicates that there may be two jurisdictions whil'h 
have followed a minority rule. Of the Westem States, 
the Courts appear to line up solidly with the great weight 
of authority, as espoused by this Court. The following 
cases support this proposition: 
Rauers Law and Collection Co. v. Higgins, fr! P. 
2d 450 (California) 
National Reserve Co. of America v. illrtropolita11 
Trust Co. of California, 112 P. 2d 598 (Californiu) 
Ba1ikers Trust Co. v. International Trust Co., cl al .. 
113 P. 2d 656 (Colorado) 
Castleman v. Redford, 124 P. 2d 293 (NeYada) 
National Motor Serrice Co. v. Walters, 379 I'. 2a 
643 (Idaho), Citing Chesney v. District Court of Sa/I 
Lake County 
Amende v. Town of Morton, 241 P. 2cl 445 (Wasl1irnr-
ton), (holding the particular assignment invalid hnt 
affirming the general rule). 
In the case of First National Bank of Topeka \' 
United Telephone Association, 353 P. 2<l 963, a Kansn' 
case, the Court discussed a factual situation which ,ms 
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,r1uarely Ill point on the issue raised here. The sole 
distiudio11 between the cited case an<l this suit, as it re-
lates to the question of assignment, is that there the 
assignor 11ad the complete benefical interest in the pro-
~eerls. Quoting ·with approval from an earlier case, the 
Kausas C'ourt says at Pages 970-71: 
"vVhen the owner of a note, for reasons satis-
factory to himself, assigns it to another, thereby 
n•sti11g iu him the full legal title, the assignee be-
comes, so far as the debtor is concerned, the real 
party in interest. The original owner is still the 
pernon to be finally benefited by the litigation, but 
Iii;; legal demand is no longer against the maker of 
the note, hut against the person to whom he has 
assigneJ it. When the obligor is sued by such 
assignee (no claim as innocent purchaser being 
im·oh·l'd), he can make any defense he could 
ha \'e made against the assignor; he is fully pro-
tected against another action; and in no way is it 
a matter of the slightest concern to him what ar-
rangement between the plaintiff and the origi-
nal creditor occasioned the assignment. This 
!wing true, it would be a sacrifice of substance to 
form to permit the defendant to defeat the action 
hy showing ... that the plaintiff was bound to 
account to his assignor for a part or all of the pro-
cPeds. We hold that the objection to the judgment 
nrged on the ground that plaintiff was not the real 
party in interest is untenable.'' 
Th~ n1aso11ing of this opinion is deemed persuasive. 
With reference to the prior case the Kansas Court 
sairl at page D70: 
'' ln the 1\Ianley decision the court reasserted 
tlrnt the assignee, who holds the full legal title to 
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a promissory note by assignment, is the real party 
in interest and may maintain an action there0;1 
against the maker, notwithstanding he has no ben-
eficial interest in the proceeds, the assi"nrnent . ~ 
lmnng been made to enable him to realize on the 
claim in the interest of the original payee.'' 
It appears clear that if the assignors of Plaintiff. 
Respondent are not indispensable parties then the a,. 
signee plaintiff must be the real party in interest. In faet, 
the cases cited generally deal with the points as a single 
issue and discuss them in the same context. Of course, 
since Defendant-Appellant did not raise the issue of J'Pa] 
party in interest below, it should not be given considera-
tion by this Court except as it may be inseparable from 
the question of indispensable party. In support of t!Ji, 
principal, reference is made to: 
Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Sugar Cu., 74 Utah~±. 
Richard v. Strike, 66 Utah 394. 
Flynders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314. 
Byron v. Payne, 58 Utah 536. 
POINT II 
THE TWELVE CAUSES OF AC'fION ARE 
PROPERLY JOINED IN PLAINTIFF-RE-
SPONDENTS' COMPLAINT, AND IN ANY 
EVENT DEFENDANT - APPELLANT HAS 
WAIVED THIS OBJECTION AND IS E8-
TOPPED TO ASS~'JRT IT EITHER IN THIS 
COURT OR IN THE COURT BELOW. 
Defendant-Appellant seeks for the first time on ap 
peal, to raise an issue of misjoinder. This question ira' 
8 
l 
not raised in the pleadings or in any proceedings whatso-
rrer in the Court below and suffers, therefore, from the 
same defect as noted with reference to real party in inter-
e~t and the cases cited in the last paragraph of Point I 
81Jorn. The sole issue for which Defendant-Appellant 
sotiglit review in this Court, as appears from his peti-
tion (R-45), is the denial by the Trial Court of his mo-
tio11 to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party. 
Except for the statement of Appellant in his brief 
that " ... several causes of action with independent 
fact~ and independent parties are joined in one action" 
there is no evidence in the record of any facts supporting 
a claim of misjoinder. In fact, it is submitted that the 
opposite is true and that ample evidence is adducible to 
establish the propriety in law of this joinder. How-
mr, 8ince the suit will only be delayed and quite possibly 
result in further and subsequent appeal unless some 
notiee is taken of the issue of misjoinder, the following 
brief argument is submitted on the point. 
Having failed to raise the issue of misjoinder either 
by way of responsive pleading or motion, the Defendant-
.\ppellallt has waived whatever rights he may have had 
otherwise and is estopped to raise the issue here or in 
the lower Court. After approximately a year of hear-
ing-R and proceedings on the issues of this case in the 
101rer Court, during which time Appellant has raised a 
series of issues, it would be unconscionable were he al-
lowed to question the basis of the joinder at this juncture. 
It is submitted that Rule 12, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure expressly prohibits this attempt to raise such 
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an objection or defense at this late elate. Rnle 12 iii) 
states in part: 
"Every defense, in la''" or faet, to a daim for 
relief in any plea<ling-, \YhPthN a rlaim, eoirntn-
claim, crossclaim, or a third party claim, shall lie 
asserted in the responsi,·e pleading therrto, if 0111 , 
is required, except that the fo]]o,Yi11g <lrfrrnei 
may, at the option of the 11leacler, he mark hi-
motion.'' · 
The rule then lists seven defenses \Yhieh may he rai'r,rl 
by motion including failure to join irnlispensahle part). 
Rule 12 (h) provides: 
''A party wain•s defenses and ohjcetio11' 
which he does not present either hy motion a< 
hereinhefore provided or, if he l1as made no m1J-
tion, in his reply or ans\n:r, except (1) that tlJI' 
defense of failure to state a claim upon which re-
lief can he granted, the clefe11se of failure to join 
an inclispensa hle party, aml the ohj0ction of failnrr, 
to state a leg-al clefe11se to a claim ma~· al~o lie 
made hy a later pleading if one is pl'!'mittrd, or hy 
motion for judgment on the pleaclillgs or at tlw 
trial on merits .... '' 
Having failed to object to the joirnler of the;-;e ne-
tions either by motion as prm·ided (and in this ca"e a 
motion to dismiss was interposed before pl<>ading) or li) 
ans-wer, such an objection come:-; too late and sl101iltl nnt 
be entertained by any court. Moore's Federal Prnilin, 
2d Ed., Volume 2, Page 2::\2!1. 
Our Rules make appropriate remc>dies arnilabk tu 
the Appellant if he can persuade the proprr ronrt that 
he would be unjustly injurc<l hy joint trial of thrse '
11 
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tions; but Respondent submits that by Appellant's argu-
ment in Point III, even were it brought in the proper 
Court and at the proper time, Appellant has completely 
misconceived his remedy. The Courts do not favor a 
multiplicity of actions. 
POINT III 
THIS PROCEEDING WAS COMMENCED IN 
THE ONLY PROPER STATE TRIBUNAL. 
Dcfenda11t-Appellant seeks in his argument, under 
Point IV to eharge the plaintiffs and their assignors with 
111iestionahle conduct in bringing the action in Utah. In 
this connection, it appears that Defendant-Appellant 
1rnul<l have preferred to litigate the issues in Colorado 
1rhere eaeh of the claimed liabilities arose. It was not 
tl1e Plaintiffs nor their assignors who left the state of 
Colorado, but the Appellant. The action was commenced 
in the state tribunal which had jurisdiction of the De-
fendant-Appellant, and for the latter to complain of 
thr natural legal consequences, whatever they may be, of 
tl1iR faet is deemed unseemly in the very least. The Appel-
lant iR at liberty to bring any proceeding he deems ad-
risable in the Colorado Courts against Plaintiffs' 
assignors. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that on the only ques-
tion which is properly presented in this appeal the Court 
lias heretofore held consistently that the assignor of 
a cauRe, though it be for collection, is not an indispensable 
11 
party to an action brought by the assignee thereon, but 
the assignee is the real party in interest. This holdina 
0 
is in line with the overwhelming weight of authority an<l 
there appears to be no persuasive reason to cha11gr· it 
in the instant case. 
There has been no misjoinder of actions, and h)· 
bringing the objection up for hearing for the fir:;t timl· 
upon appeal, after having filed a series of motions m11  
an answer, and delaying approximately one year in bring-
ing the objection up at all, Defendant-Appellant Im 
waived the defense or objection and should be estopperl 
to assert it either here or in the lower Court. 
Respondents and their assignors should not be held 
responsible for the election of the Def endanL\ ppellaut, 
and having effectively denied jurisdiction over his per-
son to the Colorado Courts by removing himself to rtillt. 
he should not now be allowed to shift the legal re:-pon 
sibility and consequences, thereof, to others. 
Respondents submit that the nature of the assigi1 
ments, upon the face thereof, show that Respondl'nb 
acquired full legal title to the chose in action earh rqi 
resented. Therefore, the judgment should be affirmerl. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSEN, SUMSION & MAD~E;; 
65 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respom!PnlY 
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